uing the sharp decline in the inflation rat It shows a steady decline in in flation over the past several months) rr .1 tIE above excerpt is a perfect example of misin fonn ation. a problem that stems Coin coufos ing the measurement ofpriee change with the measurement and causes of inflation. The foil nrc to distinguish the symptoms -like changing gasoline prices -from the causes of inflation can lead to serious policy errors.
This article presents evidence to support the hypothesis which states that efforts to counteract short-term price changes generally are unnecessary tmd counterproductive ,2 We begin bx analyzing the behavior of the indliyidlual components of the person al consumption expenditures index to determine the <<causes" of observed quarterly changes in the Lawrence S. Davidson, an~issociate prolessor ol husiness cciinOniics and pnhlie polic at Indiana cniversitv, is a visilitig scholar at the Federal Beseive Bank of St. Louis. jP~~cic lRick Tiinc.s, March 24.1982 . 2 'T'l~iisdoes not iilplv. lr>wcv.'r. that such prier:' chan.ces i:hi impose cosk on c.:ertaiii groi.ips. .I'ol ic:vinake rs nicav v••ish to erisict legislation to add re.ss these pi'iihlcnis. it is armed here only that snch increases do not warrant inacroecrnoiiiiic reoiechial~Oi icr. Alan Blinder conies to the sanie csinclnsiois: '' From the macro perspective, the voiatil ito: .mf the Cl'I often distrac.'i:s att:'ntion Ironi the ecnnomnivs m.mni.~.lerlying or i:i~ise1 me nit:e oh infl~itnni speculate that extreinie Sw ngs in th:' dI.IL in Hation rate (DeeDsionahlv contrihute to extreme swings hi national eeonomriic poi icy.'' Alan El iridm.~.'r, '''Thi..:. (.~.P,nssinucr Price Index amid the Nieasuiremneut of Recenmtluflation,'' Bi'ookincs Pmm/Dcr.s oui Leouis'inic \cticitij it chruary 1980), p. 564. average price level. We then analyze the pen orinance of a variable series con strueted to approximate the cyclical or nontrend movements in the measured inflation rate. An analysis of this series reveals why the public should be reluctant to pressure poi icmakers into reacting quickly to even large short-run changes in the measured inflation rate. Finally we present data nh ich si iggest that monetary p0 licies to combat short-run changes in the in flation rate raise the risk of increasing the underlying or long-term trend of inflation. The mneasum'ement of inflation necessarily begins with a price index. ihe most widely known and usedl index is the consumer price index (CPU, all index of the average price o [a fixed basket of goodis and services chosen by a typical urban family. The fixedweight personal consumption expenditures price index (PCEI), though similar in most respects to the CP1, is preferable to it in one particular aspect-its treatment of' the weight of housing costs .~ihe imnportan t points for our discussion are:
Ii 'the PURl is axveightcd axerage oh indivvlital goods
t2t 'flie value oh the PULl in any given mouth can he greatly imiuhi teuced 1 w changes ui tilt' price of iuirliitlual coin nil milit~es.
The measurect inflation rate is a simple niathemnati cal transformation of the above price index. For example, instead of saying that the value ofthe PCI-H rose from 110 to 104. the inflation rate expresses this l~or (rio re on this prohlcmri. see RI inder, ''The (:nrisuimnier Price mdc's auDi the \ieasnrenieuut of Recent I nllatiori, pp. 539-65. price rise as a percentage change. In the above ctxanTple, we would say that the inflation rate was 4 104 -100 percent, d)~( 100 ) x 100 percent.
Calculating the inflation rate in tllis way leads one tdl the valid conclusion that a large increase in the price of one good (e.g., food) can cause a large change in the value of the PCF:I and, therefore, in the incasured inflation rate, It is incorrect, however, to say' that food prices cause inflation. This is because the arithmetic view tells only part of the story. Individual prices rise and fitlI, often in seemingl random onmd unpredictable way's. Economnists call these re/a tire price changes (since mdvidnal prices are changing relative to one another). Monetary and fiscal policy are not designed to he effective iii changing relative prices. ihese and other illacrO stabilization policies are better stuted to affect the joint moyenlent (If all prices, or inflation.
To understand inflation, we ulust first distinguish between inflation and relative pnce changes. Relative prices are (letermined by the supply and demand conditions in the markets for individual goods. For example, suppose that there were a change in peoples tastes tllat caused them to spend mllOre tlleir income on recreation and less on durable goods, while other saving and spending plans remained the same. This change in relative demand should raise the relative price of recreational goods and services while lowering that of durahles . Since total spending remains unchanged, the total demand for all goods and services is unchanged; only the allocation (If demand across markets has been altered, Thc'refore. the overall price level is the same; only relative prices have changed.
If individuals temporarily redluced saving so they' cOil Id c'onti 91 ne pm trehasin g the sanmc' amount (If clurablc' goods while purchasing more recreational services, then the total do 1 lar demand and the price level would be higher.
4 Individuals would lIt' acting as if they were given more income, causing them to spend more. Once they' replc'uish their savings.
however, total demand and the price level will return to their original lower levels. Thus, a permami ent ll all individuals 'educed their savings, their wouhd he less lonijahle hinds acaihDilhe or 1~n siiucss mvestnlent, 'Therefore, the liDci'ease in consmnuier spending laci1it~itemlhy tlim' temporary rm'-clnctioim in saving would he offset iw adecliac in hmnsiuess spenultug on investment goods. Althomiglu the cousunler price index is tcnipmurarily increased, an investment defl~itorwould he lo'vcr, A c'niulhi ed umeasure of nverahl consumer amid himsiness prieew ould he uuu~ufIectechh~his ehuammge in saving.
clnuige in relative demand does not cause sustained inflation, though it does cause permanent changes in relative prices and may' cause a temporary c'homge in the price level.
Rc'lative price changes also occur when tllere are changes in supply conditions,~These include relative changes in lallor productivity, wages or other costs associated with the production process. Such changes ill a given individual market can cause thc' cost-per-u lit to rise, whiell in turn causes its relative price to rise. With a given income, people who continue to buy' tile higher-priced item will be forced to spend lc's5 Oil other goods, wllieh puts downward pressure on tllese prices. This '<cost-pusll" example has tIlt' same outcome as the relative demand cmxample: relative prices are Tlernlamlently changed, the price level may change temporarily, lInt inflation is unaffected.
In the case of increases in the price of inputs like oil, whicll are usc'd to produce many' goods, tilt' increases in the price level may he more pervasive and sustai led. Ifinereases in the price of oil are pushed through,'' causing the retail price of most goods to rise, individuals whose income has not similarly ri semI are able to Ilny fewer goods and services at the higher prices. Both the qnantit\' demanded and supplied are, therefore, lowered. This lower rate (If output is permanent unless incomes rise. A tax rc'-Ilate accompanied lly'an increase in the growth rate (If money could temporaril~'raise incomes enough to restore demand to the earlier ratc' of production, but will le~tdto another uld'rea5e in the price level as nldividlnals attenlpt to buy' nlore of all goods.
The point of tllese exaumples is that a varic'ty of hictors aflbcting the cost and relative demamldl strnc'-tunes in individual markets can cause relative pric'c's to change. Ihe constrailt that binds the price changes in all tIlt' markets is total spending, or in- from all prices using together, oi merely one price centag s of total expenditure allocated to each rising by itself. Fuithermore, this change may prove component. to be either temporary or permanent. Policymakers I'he measured average yearly inflation rate more concerned with the causes of and cure for inflation .
. . than tripled from 1.85 percent in the initial period to would find this hiddlen information highly relevant.
6.34 percent in the latter. The standard deviation, a Consider the behavior of the individual prices of measure of dispersion arouiTd the average, more than goods and services mncludledi in the PCEI over the doubled. In the 1968-81 period, the annualized past 23 years. Motor vehicles: -4.0Y~-to 14.6% Nmel oil and coal: --24.6cc to 54.02<3-Fuel oil and coal prices, the fastest-growing consumer prices, averaged over 14 percent per year, followed closely by gas and oil atabout 10.6 perceutper year. Furniture (3.7 percent) and clothing (3.8 percent) were the most slowly growing consumer prices.
The evidlence fionl table 1 suggests that tile measuredI inflation of the recent past is not the result of all prices rising at the same rate each quarter. These figures, however, say very little about the role of particular relative prices as causes of sustained price change. For example, fuel oil and coal prices rose, on average, fluster than any of the other prices. But these increases were anything but gradlual or persistent. Of tile 88 quarters from 11/1959 to 1/1981, the inflation rate ofhuel oil and coal exceeded tile rate ofthe PCEI only 45 times. That means during 43 of the quarters, fuel oil and coal prices rose more slowly than overall inflation. In 22 of these quarters, the absolute price of fuel oil and coal fell (a negative inflation rate for this category). During these 88 quarters, there was not a single episode when the inflation rate on fuel oil and coal increased for nuore thami four consectmtn-e quarters. This patterml (though not necessarily tile magnitude) of volatility is typical of most price components. Chart 1, which presents tile growth rates of the PCEI and two of its conlponents, reveals the oscillatory behavior of the PCEI. Note that there has been only one episode since 1959 when the overall PCEI inflation rate climbed consecutively for more than three quarters. More will he said about that episode below.
it is cumbersome to discuss each individual price change and its irnphcations for the measured overall inflation rate. Therefore, we introduce a summary measure of nonproportion al or relative price 'These confidence intervals mts suInc that qui arterlv inRation rate changes aic normaliv d istrilitited -A normal di stribti lion rough lv If all prices grow at tile same rate, HELP will equal zero. If, however, a few prices rise significantly faster during the quarter than the rest, the value of HELP will rise. If these prices then dedtelerate (andl/ or ifthe others accelerate), so that all prices are again rising more equally, HELP will fall.
As chart 2 shows, the HELP measure has a number of interesting features:
( impact upon overall changes in the measured inflation rate. This finding has important policy couitent. Macroeconomic policies, which are dlesigned to affect incomes or speuding, are not efficient devices for combating the frequent and quickly reversible relative price changes. Therefore, policy aimed exclusively at stabilizing all changes in the inflation rate will he unproductive. It inay even be counterproductive if the relative price changes are both highly unpredictable and transient. Monetarists have argued that the diomimiant dIeterminant of sustained spending change is money growth. Therefkhre, tluey say, it is primarily sustained money growth that produces inflation (a sustained increase in the prices of all goods and services).
Past studies have foundl that the underlying inflation rate is significantly relatedl to past growth rates Monetarists also believe that there are numerous sources of price change, yet only changes in money growth can permanently alter the rate of inflation. Therefore, we expect that nonmonetary factors will sometimes affect short-term measured inflation rates. If these nonmonetary sources of measured inflation arise unexpectedly over time, and if they only temporarily affect the inflation rate, then the only lasting, predictable and controllable source of inflation would be monetary growth.
One way to determine ifthe monetary explanation of inflation is valid is to examine the impact of nonmonetary influences on price changes to see ifthey have any long-run influences on inflation. To do this,
we define nonmonetary price change as the measured inflation rate of a given quarter, minus the 12-quarter moving average of money growth rates. We then examine the behavior ofthis series (referred to as PDEV) and the changes in it (henceforth called A). The monetarist view of inflation would be supported by a variety ofevidence about PDEV and A:
(1) If changes in nonmonetary inflation, A, are temporary, then positive values of A soon would be followed by negative ones. Accordingly, PDEV would rise and then fall toward its original value.
(2) Ifthe increases in A are totallyreversible, then over the sample period the sum of the negative As would be exactly equal to the sum of the positive "Keith M. within the sample period -We can use a standard Out ofSS quarters. PDFV k-Il (A was negative) 45 statistical procedure to indicate whether any given times. Further, there were 56 times when a rise in PDEV urA is worth worrying about (large enough te PDEV was followed by a fidi, or s-ice versa. Vsing a he considered a statistically important deviation statistical test designee1 to measure the regu larih-of from zero). For exam pie, in chart 3, note that PD EV these changes, we find no significant relationship is less than zero during most quarters priortu 1973. Is between A valnes over time)
4 This means that this evidence that noninonetary factors were holding changes in the rate of nonmonetary price change are inflation substantially below the rate dictated by money? 74 Sec Eclwart:i j. Kctrte. .Leastsinitie Sta:.c.s[ccs ants! I.~sntsFiisctrcca (Ficirper& Row, 1968 Table 2 Nonmonetary Price Change 1959 -1972 1973 1951 1959 -1981 037°/ 121% 009°o
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or A in chart 3 th it fall outside the shaded are a rue cx iclenee that nonmonet-tr~factors cause ci br pric -changes)5 A n umbe i (sar thi cc oi foui) of eousecut e quarte rs of large and rising i-tInes of PDL\ or rising As xx oulel he eonsiclc ied r ide nec of the persistent e fleet of nonmonetas x factors on pi ice ch uige.
Chart 3 r x eu s that the only nm of I-u ge PDL\ x ilue. occuired ox ci the fbur-qu-mrtc r p nod from 1J 1974 to I\ /1974.16 He e, noninon 4 in i-ic tots eontrihuteci to inflation i isin ' 5 rnific~untl\ fusten th -in monex lot on -ear. Anothe r pisodie from 11/1972 to 19s2 xx hich lie-s ne-jr the rqe etion recrion ompriscs three qu trtc rs xx hen iufl ition .~ne x lois is than inone x -Th se e pisode 5 clese ire adchtional c-on siler-ition since it e onslcl be ii~nec 1 that si teni-itie nomiionc tan fac te is c-mis ed ust mined infl-mtnou ahox e and be Ion the monex gioxi th site W hat happened dunn Cr 197-1 h td its be ginning in 1\ /~xx hen the pu ic-c s of fuel oil and co-ti ro e at an innual izecl tate nf 6-3 p n e nt and "as and od ps ice 5 Oesr sample vie-IsIs noR-one-e-stinnatc-of the-true me-ant oFPDEV. Ihe shaded area us chart 3 is called a ecsnfidenc-t-inte-rval. This shows Isv how titniclt the nseani could vary itt repeated santspit-s wnthostt rchetiitg tltat the popnlattoit ntsean is zero. Thscns, if wettnokstncsther itsdepe-ntelentt sanuple asic 1 funnel a ntetnt-zc-rds value for tine-mean that was inssic/e tine cctssficlenc:e interval, it wetnlcl nest rehnte' the hypothesis that the;-popnlaticnn noesuns is sc-no. The area csestssde tlte cttnfsdenee itstervstl is cctlleel the-rejec-ticits legion. Ifa sample ttteant lies in this zone-, it reiccts the hypothesis titat tue ntectts vstltse-tif ntcnntnttcinetary itsflation is zerst. By ehsoetsnit g a I eve I cc cotsficle s ct~-log itcr thtst ts 95 jsc-tee itt -say 99 ice scent. SIte area iii cltart 3 wostlel ice wider antd there would he sits rtttts P DRV valises us the n-eject is inn sen-ca -Lcswering the' sectsfid entee level its 90 pereesit elect-s tsot citantge tIne resenlts, thcsttgls titere arctwo episcsdt-s tltatnsearly lall insin the rejections region: 1/l980-I\7 1980 aittl P/1972-1571972. The fonster pcniod witnessed severe otI prnce slncscks while the latter, which is disc-n tssesl shore ins tInea-it, cscc -s~ns-n-eel clnri ssg 'vs uge innsel price c-es ts t ro Is -1 e]3 5~e con nest'setri C: vst risen t of RI )E 5-' cli sc-n 55cc 1 ts h sotss cite t3 vie-he's the sainst-gt-nse--nsd eonnc:ldnsionn: tlte hares-st valises of FOES' steccsr dtnttiisg 1974. Usinsg this variannt cci PDEV, lsowe-s-e-n, tltc'rt is sins series esicosssee-entivc-valises of FDE\' inn tine-rejecticcns strese, This is eve-n stronsger eviclensce titans tlsstt presenstedl inn the text fcnr the transsitccrv natnnre csf c:lsansges ins nnccnsmennne-tarv insliauions.
increased by 33 percent. ins I/1974 both energy groups again had large anntnalizeei rate increases of 91 percent and 63 percent, respectively. These increases, though very large, accounted for only about half of the increase in the measured inflation rate of the first quarter in 1974. In huct 17 of the 18 connponent prices accelerated -~an historical rarity-.
By 11/1974 the inflation rate of energy items, though still high. was failing dramatically. Judging from food and energy-prices alone, the ox-'erall inflation rate e-orslcl have fdllen as low as 7.4 percent (h-ow 12.4 percent in 1/1974) had it not been for au increase in the relative price of motor vehicles and nondurables (other than food and energy). The overall inflation rate staved at 9.6 percent in I1I~1974 and inc-he-cl up to 97 percent in IV/ 1974 despite the fact that energy prices had leveled off. In the last quarter, the problem appears to be the-12 percent increase in food prices. Given the large weight on food prices, measured inflation could have been dioxvn to about 8 percent or less had it not been for this single er-cut.
To summarize, this historical period fonsneI nonmonetary sources of inflation persistently greater than zero. It followed, however, on the heels of ass usnpreecdented jump in the rate of increase of energyprices. It appears that within six months the peak nomnonetary efflict had been reachedl.17 Further, it appears that events beyond the secoisel quarter of 1974 were separate-hint adiacent periods of equally had luck. In the first quarter of 1974, nnost prices responded to the oil crisis. If the snbseqtsen t increases in motor vehicles, nonndnrahies and fooel prices at various times in the next nine months were related to earlier energy price increases, theis ive do have-a single-episode. Er-en in this interpretation, the-bulk of the effbe:t of PDEV occurred within six monsths, and trace-s of it were sc:arce-within 12.18 The-othe-r intere-'sting episoele oeeurre-d in 1972 sx'hen inflation was beloxi-the trend growth of money. Tb is episode shows tlsat the more-stringent snnnc, sen tile n nnt nine tlsencl iohsss S F etccnns I ssc ns.,s Pisces ante 1 Sisnrt-fInnss Econtcnnssie Perfcsrnsansee-,' this Rc-n-ic-sc tjsensnnsny The previous sections stsggest that the maims cause of s ustaineel incre-ases in nse-asurecl in flatiesn is nest chansges in relative prices. The data pre-se-ntecl in this section show that tlsec trend growth rate of money rose from about 2 percent in the-early lP 6 Os to 7 perce-nst in the early iPSOs. This se-ction suggests that this rising trend ste-ms from an infhrmnatioss problem. We-already hex-c slsown that the nneasesreel inflation rate often accelerate-s when relative prices change. If pohe>'makers nuisreaei such temporary juere-ases as permanent changes in the inflation rate-, they may employ a eontractionarv mossetarv pol iex'. We show below that tight money periods have-usually fbiiowed large-i nc:reases in the measured inflation ratehut have bee-ms fksllowe-el by periesels of monetary expansion. At the-c-nd ofeac-h cycle, the-trernel growth rate of both nuoney ansd prices has bee-ms higher. Clsart 4 plots the deviations frons tressel for hotls theamsnualizecl dldmartecrl\-rates of growth of tlse CPI amsd Ml.~°The-slsacleel x'estie-al bars represent c-pisoele-s of large price increases, lasting two or more ejnsarteis, in wh ic-Is the use-assure-el insfiation rate-grew faster thass its tressel. Ins each ease-, xx-e finsel tlsese ahove-tretsel pric'e isscreases aecesnnpans ieel by large reductionss ins tlse growth rate of sssonev afldl/or below-trend monetary grow-th.
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